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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Societal Importance of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Imagine a scenario where a male employer propositions a female
employee who is eager to move up the corporate ladder. He asks her
for sexual favors while at work, and she expressly rejects his
advances. Although she is an exemplary employee, the female
employee is subsequently terminated from the company as a result of
her rejection of her supervisor's advances. Would she have a
retaliation claim against the employer? If she lives within the
geographical boundaries of the Fifth Circuit, the answer may very
well be "no," ' but the Eighth Circuit might disagree and allow the suit
if she lives within its jurisdiction. 2 Unfortunately, since the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the issue and given direction to the
lower courts, whether the former employee has a retaliation claim
against her employer would likely depend on where she lives.
To determine whether an employee has a retaliation claim against
an employer, one must examine Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which forbids discrimination on the basis of an "individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 3 Described as the "most
important legislation of the twentieth century," 4 the Act "reflected for
America a new sense of national identity, an America no longer
5
ambivalent about who it included or what its values were."
1. See LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir.
2007) (finding that an employee's rejection of a supervisor's sexual advances was
not a protected activity, and therefore the employee's retaliation claim failed).
2. See Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding
that an employee engaged in a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim
by rejecting a supervisor's sexual advances).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
4. D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45
VAND. L. REv. 349, 350 (1992).
5. Id. at 351. Title VII symbolizes a point in our nation's history where
America sought to rise above the racism of the past and eliminate discrimination in
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Interestingly enough, however, discrimination based upon one's sex
was not originally a part of the Act. Because the addition of this
category has had significant ramifications since its passage in 1964,
''one must infer a Congressional intention that such legislation
be
effective to carry out its underlying social policy-which in this case
is to eradicate every instance of sex-based employment discrimination
6
that is not founded upon a bona fide occupational qualification."
Thus, it is important to look at the history of the Act to determine how
the addition of sex as a forbidden basis of discrimination should be
understood and interpreted in the employment context.
B. How Sex as a ForbiddenBasis of Discriminationwas Added to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was Congress' first
successful attempt to protect women and minorities engaged in private
employment from discrimination. 7 The Act originally did not protect
against discrimination based on one's sex. Howard Smith, a
congressman of Virginia who did not support the Act, made the
addition of sex as a forbidden basis of discrimination as a floor
amendment without any previous legislative hearings or debates. 8 One
academic who examined the history of the Civil Rights Act concluded
that "it is abundantly clear that a principal motive in introducing [the
floor amendment] was to prevent passage of the basic legislation
being considered by Congress, rather than solicitude for women's
employment rights." 9 Congressman Smith, however, maintained that
the workplace. Id. "If discrimination in the workplace was a stone in the path of
national progress, Title VII would be the instrument by which it was rolled away."

Id.
6. Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discriminationin American Law III: Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 312

(1968).
7.

WILLIAM F. PEPPER & FLORYNCE R. KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLOYMENT 17-18 (noting that although "basic cultural and biological differences
exist between men and women," employers have used such differences to
discriminate "without a firm basis in reason or fact, and now, since the passage of
Title VII, without a basis in law").
8. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964).
9. Kanowitz, supra note 6, at 311 (citations omitted). "Had the sex provisions
of Title VII been presented then as a separate bill, rather than being coupled as they
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he was "very serious about this amendment" and that it had "been
offered several times before, but it was offered at inappropriate places
in the bill."' 0 He further stated he did "not think it can do any harm to
this legislation; maybe it can do some good."" The amendment
passed with little discussion by a vote of 168 - 133,12 but its impact
has had profound implications in the workplace environment.
Accordingly, while the employment relationship has historically
been an "at-will" relationship, meaning that the employer or employee
may end the relationship at any time, with or without cause or reason
and suffer no legal liability for doing so, 1 3 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act sets out specific limitations to the at-will relationship. The Act
makes it illegal for employers to engage in any unlawful employment
practice, including not hiring a person based on one's sex or depriving
a person of other opportunities associated with the workplace based on
14
gender.
While 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
protects the employee from unwelcome sexual advances or hostile
activities based on one's sex, 15 it also protects the employee who
opposes such unlawful employment practices from retaliation. 16 The
were in an effusion of Congressional gimmickry with legislation aimed at curbing
racial and ethnic discrimination, their defeat in 1964 would have been virtually
assured." Id. at 310.
10. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2584.
13. Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At- Will: The Impending Death of a
Doctrine,37 AM. Bus. L.J. 653, 653 (2000).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
15. PEPPER & KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 41. Discrimination based on one's
sex forbids any employer action that denies the privileges of employment to a
person based on sexual requirements or sexual behavior. Id. This includes "sexually
related threats, intimidation or coercion," as well as "pressures imposed upon an
employee by a supervisor ...in an effort to coerce desired sexual behavior ....Id.
16. BARBARA LLNDEMANN & DAvID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 51, 275 (The Bureau of National Affairs 1995) (1992). The

common defenses that an employer might assert after an employee has initiated a
retaliation claim are that the employee's protest was too outrageous; the employee
could not have reasonably believed the challenged employment practice is unlawful
under Title VII; the employer was not aware of the employee's opposition to the
alleged unlawful practice; or that the employee was disciplined for "legitimate
business reasons" and not for retaliation based on the employee's participation or
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Supreme Court articulated differences in the purposes of the antidiscrimination provision and the anti-retaliation provision of § 2000e3.17 Specifically, while the primary objective of the antidiscrimination provision is to protect employees based on "racial,
ethnic, religious, or gender-based status," the purpose of the antiretaliation provision is to prevent an employer from retaliating against
18
an employee who seeks to enforce the guarantees of the Act.
Although the Supreme Court set a high threshold for establishing
claims of sexual harassment, 19 it has been less strict in interpreting
retaliation claims. In making this distinction, the Court examined the
purposes of the two types of claims, finding that
The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where
individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial,
ethnic, religious, or gender-based status. The anti-retaliation
provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic
20
guarantees.

It is now well settled that an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on his or her gender by sexually harassing
him or her. 2 1 The Supreme Court has opined that the test for whether
opposition. Id. at 276.
17. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). The
Supreme Court opined that "the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive
provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and
conditions of employment." Id. at 64.
18. Id. at 63.
19. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). The
Supreme Court held that "no reasonable person" would believe that an employer's
"single incident" of sexual harassment violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id. at 271.
20. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63 (citation omitted).
21. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has defined
sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" provided that the employer: (i)
explicitly or implicitly requires the employee to submit to the conduct as a condition
of employment, (ii) bases employment decisions on the employee's willingness to
engage in such conduct, or (iii) creates a hostile work environment if the employee
refuses to engage in the conduct. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1972). While EEOC
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sexual harassment has occurred is not a "mathematically precise test"
22
and requires the Court to evaluate the totality of the circumstances.
The Supreme Court has included unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical sexual
communication in its definition of sexual harassment. 23 However, the
Supreme Court has also noted that some behaviors clearly do not
implicate a sexual harassment claim. For example, "'simple teasing,'
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious)"
24
do not amount to a sexual harassment claim.
Although the Supreme Court has set clear definitional boundaries
for what behaviors may constitute sexual harassment for a
discriminationclaim, it has not decided the issue of whether activities
such as an employee rejecting an employer's sexual advances may
also qualify as a protected activity for the purpose of establishing a
retaliationclaim.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the
necessary elements to prove a prima facie case of retaliation against
an employer, one of which is that the employee engaged in a protected
guidelines are not binding on the courts, most courts, including the Supreme Court,
look to EEOC findings for guidance when defining sexual harassment. See Meritor
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that courts should look to
EEOC findings for guidance since the findings are based on the agency's informed
and experienced judgment); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 65-66 (2006) (deferring to the EEOC's interpretation that the anti-retaliation
provision provides broad coverage to the employee).
22. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993). In evaluating the totality
of the circumstances, factors to consider are "the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." Id. at 23.
23. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63. By including these sorts of behaviors in its
definition of sexual harassment, the Supreme Court follows its standard set forth in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., which takes a "middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a
chological injury." Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
24. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). The court noted
that it had "made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the
terms and conditions of employment .... ." Id. Such a distinction between conduct
that is extreme and conduct that is not extreme filters out complaints attacking "the
ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language,
gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing." LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 16,
at 175.
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activity. Part II compares the two separate clauses outlined in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3, the participation clause and the opposition clause,
which define the parameters of what constitutes a protected activity
for purposes of a retaliation claim. In addition, Part II focuses on the
circuit splits in applying the opposition clause standard, examining the
rationale as to why circuits that have analyzed the opposition clause of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 have come to contradictory holdings.
Part III emphasizes the importance of the Supreme Court
resolving the conflict among the circuits as to whether an employee's
rejection of a supervisor's sexual advances constitutes a protected
activity. Part III explores how the Court would likely resolve the
issue, particularly in light of the recent Supreme Court ruling in
Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson
25
Tennessee.
County,
Finally, Part IV examines how the Supreme Court should rule on
the issue of whether rejecting a supervisor's sexual advances in the
workplace is a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim
under § 2000e-3. Part IV advances a social science argument and a
statistics argument to support the ultimate conclusion that rejecting a
supervisor's sexual advances should constitute a protected activity.
Additionally, Part IV asserts the Supreme Court should give
appropriate deference to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the federal administrative agency which
enforces laws prohibiting retaliation in the workplace, including Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
II. LOGISTICS OF A RETALIATION CLAIM

A. The Prevalence of Retaliation in the Workplace
Retaliation is prevalent in the workplace, comprising a significant
portion of claims asserted in discrimination cases. 26 For example, in
2007, the EEOC received 26,663 claims of retaliation,27 compared to a
25. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846 (2009).
26. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18 (2005); see also infra
Part IV.A.
27. Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission,
Retaliation,
http://www.eeoc.gov/types/retaliation.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
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total of 12,510 claims of sexual harassment. 2 8 Retaliation claims
increased dramatically from 1997, where 22.6% of the total 80,680
charges were retaliation claims, to 2007, where 32.3% of the total
82,792 charges were retaliation claims. 29 The increase in the number
of retaliation claims may have come about partially because retaliation
claims are often more successful than discrimination claims.3 ° This
may be due in part to the fact that the EEOC has defined the antiretaliation provision as exceptionally broad, 3 ' and courts have found
exceptions to remedial statutes such as Title VII should be interpreted
32
narrowly.
B. The Prima Facie Case of a Retaliation Claim
Because a retaliation claim may be more successful than a
discrimination claim, a functional understanding of the elements that
comprise a retaliation claim is necessary to determine the scope of
such claims. Once the scope is defined, one may evaluate those
employer actions, such as sexually propositioning an employee, which
may give rise to an employee-initiated retaliation claim against the
employer.
Section 2000e-3 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an
anti-retaliation provision that provides that

28. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment,
http://www.eeoc.gov/types/sexualharassment.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
Charge Statistics,
29. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
30. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1998)
(opining "[i]t sometimes happens-more frequently than might be imagined-that
an employee whose primary claim of discrimination cannot survive pre-trial
dispositive motions is able to take to trial the secondary claim that he or she was
fired or adversely affected in retaliation for asserting the primary claim").
31. 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, p. 8-13 (1998); see also Jencks v.
Modem Woodmen of Am., 479 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2007) (determining that
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII be construed liberally); discussion and
sources cited supra note 21.
32. Cobb v. Contract Transp., Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 559 (6th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that narrowly construing exceptions to remedial statutes follows the

"traditional canons of statutory interpretation.").
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"[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees ... because [the
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice... or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
33
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2000e-3 of Title VII as
34
"[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms."
The Supreme Court has held the employee bears the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of employer retaliation. 35 The
employee must provide evidence establishing: (i) that he or she was
engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (ii) that the employer knew
of the statutorily protected activity and took an adverse employment
action against the employee; and (iii) that a causal connection exists
between the two. 36 Once the employee produces the necessary
evidence, the burden then shifts to the employer to provide a
37
legitimate, non-discriminatory motive for its employment decision.
Finally, the court affords the employee the opportunity to show that
the employer's stated motive for its decision is in actuality a pretext
38
for the prohibited retaliation.
C. The ParticipationClause as Compared to the Opposition Clause
Section 2000e-3 contains two separate clauses: the "participation
clause" and the "opposition clause." These clauses define the
parameters of what constitutes a "protected activity" for purposes of a
retaliation claim. In other words, an employee who engages in
activities under either the "participation clause" or activities under the

33.
34.
35.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

36.

LAWRENCE SOLOTOFF & HENRY S. KRAMER, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 3-64 (Law Journal Press 2007) (1994);
see also LeMaire v. La. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2007);
Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007); Xin Liu v.
Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2003).
37. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

38. Id. at 804.
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"opposition clause" has engaged in a protected activity for the
purposes of bringing a retaliation claim.39
The participation clause of § 2000e-3 refers to the employee who
"has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated" in a
discrimination claim. Among other things, this clause protects the
employee who has filed an EEOC complaint or indicated an intent to
file an EEOC complaint of employment discrimination.4 0 It also
protects the employee who has testified on behalf of another employee
who has filed a sexual harassment charge; the employee who has
refused to testify at the request of his or her employer; and the
employee who has filed charges against prior employers.41
The opposition clause, in contrast, protects the employee who
42
"has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice."
The purpose of the opposition clause is to deter a supervisor from
invoking retaliatory measures against the employee who has opposed
the supervisor's unlawful employment practices. 43 In order for a court
to determine whether an employee is protected by the opposition
clause, it must ask two questions. First, the court must determine
whether the employee's conduct was oppositional in nature, and
second, if the employee's conduct was oppositional, whether the
oppositional conduct was directed at an employment practice made
unlawful by Title VII.44
39. FRANCES ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAWPRINCIPLES, LANDMARK DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE RISK
MANAGEMENT 23 (Quorum Books 1999). As one circuit court has noted, "[tihe
distinction between employee activities protected by the participation clause and
those protected by the opposition clause is significant because federal courts have

generally granted less protection for opposition than for participation in enforcement
proceedings." Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312
(6th Cir. 1989).
40. See generally Mariani Colon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec. ex. rel. Chertoff,
511 F.3d 216, 223 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that contacting the EEOC is a protected
activity); Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1156 (9th
Cir. 1982) (making no legal distinction between filing an EEOC charge and

indicating an intent to file an EEOC charge).
41. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 16, at 276-77.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
43. Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons, 842 F.2d
590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988).
44.

Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting "Reasonableness":A New Look at Title VII's
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In answering the first question, most courts agree the opposition
clause, "by definition, applies in the absence of a formal charge of
discrimination. It protects a variety of precharge and noncharge
conduct, ranging from the informal voicing of complaints to
supervisors to the formal invocation of an employer's internal
grievance procedures. 4 5 Although the lower courts have indicated
what sorts of activities might be considered a protected activity under
the opposition clause, the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly
defined that conduct which it considers oppositional for purposes of a
46
retaliation claim under the opposition clause.

In answering the second question, most courts have found that the
employee must only show that he or she had a reasonable belief that
Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469, 1482 (2007). "[Tihe
Supreme Court has yet to address the first question and only recently provided
limited guidance with respect to the second." Id. (footnote omitted). See also
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 16, at 278. For example, courts have
systematically held that a plaintiff may prevail on his or her retaliation claim even if
a jury determines the employer's activity was not unlawful under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gorod, supra, at 1484.
45. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 16, at 278 (citing Rollins v. Florida
Dep't of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989)) (noting that an
employee who informally voices a complaint is protected by the opposition clause);
Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that
informal protests, such as "voicing complaints to employers or using an employer's
grievance procedures" is protected by the opposition clause); Ferguson v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1200 (D. Del. 1983) (recognizing that
the opposition clause does not define which specific activities are protected and is
therefore unclear, but finding that an employee's internal complaints to management
is a protected activity); see also Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331
(D.C. Cir. 1991) ("The statute itself proscribes 'discriminat[ion]' against those who
invoke the Act's protections; the statute does not limit its reach only to acts of
retaliation that take the form of cognizable employment actions such as discharge,
transfer, or demotion.").
46. The Supreme Court only recently decided Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, whereby the Court held
an employee who participates in an internal investigation is protected by the
opposition clause of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.Ct. 846 (2009). We do not yet know
how far the Supreme Court is willing to extend this holding to other types of
employee conduct. It remains to be seen whether an employee who rejects a
supervisor's sexual advances has engaged in conduct that is "oppositional in nature,"
thereby triggering protection under the opposition clause. See discussion infra Part
III.A-B.
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the opposed employment practice was unlawful.47 Most courts do not
limit the scope of this clause to actual violations and instead apply the
"reasonable belief' standard since such a narrow interpretation would
be contrary to the purpose of the opposition clause.48 Specifically,
courts are concerned that employees may not assert legitimate claims
if the "reasonable belief" standard did not apply. If employees were
incorrect in believing the conduct they opposed was unlawful, the
49
employees would not be protected from retaliation.
The circuit courts largely agree on the standard to determine
whether the opposition clause applies, looking at whether the
employee's conduct was oppositional in nature and whether the
employee's conduct was directed at an unlawful employment practice.
However, courts have differed in how to apply the standard,5 ° thereby
51
coming to inconsistent findings.
D. The CircuitSplits in Applying the Opposition Clause Standard
Offer Little Guidance in Determining the Scope of a
"ProtectedActivity"
The Supreme Court recently clarified the second element of a
prima facie case of retaliation, that the employer had knowledge of the
statutorily protected activity that the employee was engaged in and
took an adverse employment action against the employee. 52 The Court
47. Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass'n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting
that the reasonable belief standard is consistent with the purpose of Title VII to
eliminate employment discrimination); see also McHenemy v. City of Rochester,
241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2001); Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., 40 F.3d 187, 195
(7th Cir. 1994); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130,
1137-38 (5th Cir. 1981); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th
Cir. 1981).
48. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 16, at 280.
49. Id.
50. Gorod, supra note 44, at 1484. The standard employed by the appellate
courts has resulted in "significant variation in [its] application," in large part because
"the standard actually says little about what a plaintiff must show in practice to
establish that her conduct is protected." Id.
51. See LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2007);
Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000).
52. SOLOTOFF & KRAMER, supra note 36, at 63-64; see also LeMaire, 480
F.3d at 388, Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007);
Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2003).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol46/iss1/6

12

Watson Winslow: When Just Saying "No" is Not Enough: How an Employee Who Rejects

20091

WHEN JUST SAYING "NO" IS NOT ENOUGH

223

examined the parameters of an "adverse employment action," noting
that the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to prohibit
employers from retaliating against those employees who might
complain of discrimination to the EEOC.53 In regard to clarifying an
adverse employment action, the Court stated that "normal petty
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not
54
create such deterrence."
Although the Supreme Court cleared up confusion as to the
definition of an "adverse employment action" in Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the Court has yet to fully define
the boundaries of a "protected activity" under the opposition clause of
§ 2000e-3. Therefore, as noted above, confusion exists in the lower
courts. In particular, the lower courts have not come to a consensus as
to whether an employee's rejection of a supervisor's sexual
advances-without more--qualifies as a statutorily "protected
activity" under the opposition clause.
1. Two FederalCircuit Courts Have Specifically Addressed the Issue,
Arriving at Differing Conclusions
a. The Fifth Circuit
Only two federal circuits, the Fifth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit,
have directly addressed the issue of whether an employee who rejects
a supervisor's sexual advances has engaged in a protected activity
under the opposition clause of § 2000e-3 for purposes of a retaliation
claim, with the courts arriving at differing conclusions. 55 The Fifth
Circuit held in LeMaire v. Louisiana Department of Transportation
and Development that a person who rejects an employer's sexual
advances has not engaged in a protected activity.56 LeMaire involved

53.
54.
55.
rejection

Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006).
Id. at 68.
Compare, e.g., LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 389 (finding that an employee's
of a supervisor's sexual advances was not a protected activity, and

therefore the employee's retaliation claim failed) with Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1007
(holding that an employee has engaged in a protected activity for purposes of a
retaliation claim by rejecting a supervisor's sexual advances).
56. LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 388.
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an employee who refused his supervisor's sexual advances.57
Following this rejection, LeMaire's supervisor ordered LeMaire to
spray herbicide, a task that LeMaire argued was retaliatory since his
job consisted of operating and maintaining drawbridges.58 The court
found that LeMaire had not engaged in a protected activity for
purposes of his retaliation claim. 59 In reaching this conclusion, the
court stated that at the time of the supervisor's order to spray
herbicide, LeMaire had not yet complained of the sexual advances,
and that rejection of the advances without such a complaint was not a
60
protected activity.
In another Fifth Circuit case, Frank v. Harris County, Yolanda
Frank was terminated from her position as deputy constable for Harris
County. 6 1 Frank alleged that she was terminated for rejecting, though
not reporting, at least six sexual advances initiated by her supervisor,
Constable Chambers. 62 In assessing Frank's retaliation claim, the Fifth
Circuit found that Frank failed to engage in a protected activity, giving
no credence to Frank's proposition that her express rejection of
63
Chambers' sexual advances itself constituted a protected activity.
The court stated that Frank provided "no authority" for her position,
and therefore her retaliation claim failed.64
b. The Eighth Circuit
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's findings in LeMaire and Frank,
the Eighth Circuit ruled in Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc. that an employee
who rejects an employer's sexual advances has engaged in a protected
activity. 65 Ogden's supervisor made several sexual advances to
57. Id. at 389.
58. Id. at 385.
59. Id. at 389.
60. Id. In addition, the court noted that in a previous unpublished case, the
Fifth Circuit held that an employee's single "express rejection" of an employer's
sexual advances was not protected. Id. (citing Frank v. Harris County, 118 F. App'x
799, 804 (5th Cir. 2004)).
61. Frank, 118F.App'xat800.
62. Id. at 801.
63. Id. at 804.
64. Id.
65. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000).
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Ogden, including grabbing her by the waist and consistently
propositioning her. 66 He conditioned her yearly evaluation, and
consequently her yearly raise, on Ogden accepting these sexual
advances. 67 After repeatedly rejecting her supervisor's advances,
Ogden eventually quit her job without receiving the evaluation and
filed a retaliation claim against her employer. 68 Although Ogden's
former employer argued she had not engaged in a protected activity,
the Eighth Circuit decided that Ogden's rejection of her supervisor's
advances was in opposition to her employer's discriminatory
practices, finding that Ogden engaged in "the most basic form69of
protected activity" when she told him to stop his unlawful conduct.
2. The Silent Circuits
In addition to the conflicting decisions of the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits on this issue, several other circuits have discussed the scope
of the opposition clause of § 2000e-3 without expressly ruling on the
issue. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has avoided resolving this
dispute, deciding relevant cases based on lack of an adverse
employment action or lack of an employee's reasonable belief that the
action opposed was a Title VII violation. v

The Second Circuit has reacted similarly, deciding not to rule on
whether rejection of an employer's sexual advances constitutes a
protected activity, holding that a ruling on the issue would have had
no bearing on the outcome of the case before it.7" Several district
66. Id. at 1003.
67. Id. at 1003-04.
68. Id. at 1004.
69. Id. at 1007.
70. See Murray v. Chi. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 880, 890 (7th Cir. 2001). The
court acknowledged that no precedent existed in the Seventh Circuit as to whether

rejection of an employer's sexual advances constitutes a protected activity for
purposes of a retaliation. Id. However, the court chose not to decide the issue since
the employee did not demonstrate an adverse employment action. Id.; see also Tate
v. Executive Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2008). The court
chose not to resolve the issue since the employee did not show a reasonable belief
that the employment practice he opposed was unlawful. Id.
71. Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 366 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that the
employee's retaliation claim was "coextensive" with her discrimination claim in this
circumstance and would not warrant a separate award).
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courts within this jurisdiction, however, have opined on the issue,
coming to differing conclusions.7 2 One district court within this circuit
has decided "even the broadest interpretation of a retaliation claim
cannot encompass instances where the alleged 'protected activity'
consists simply of declining a harasser's sexual advances ....If it

were otherwise, every harassment claim would automatically state a
retaliation claim as well. 73 The court noted the employer did not
"mistreat, demote, fire, discipline, or punish" the employee after she
rejected the sexual advances and that the employee made no effort to
report the advances, though posters were displayed throughout the
workplace with phone numbers to report such behavior.74 Another
district court in the same circuit, however, has interpreted the breadth
of "protected activities" under the opposition clause more broadly,
noting that an employer who engages in sexual harassment against an
employee is acting unlawfully, and that the employee's rejection of
the behavior therefore conforms to the purpose of the opposition
clause.7 5

While the Second and Third Circuits have not squarely ruled on
this particular issue, the circuits have confronted the issue of what
constitutes a protected activity in regard to retaliation in response to a
76
race discrimination and an age discrimination claim, respectively.

72. The Second Circuit has declined to review the analysis of the district
courts in interpreting the scope of protected activities under the opposition clause or
otherwise to resolve this conflict.
73. Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 437, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). After the employee rejected her supervisor's sexual advances, the supervisor
ordered her to move heavy items beyond her capabilities to lift, and she was
subsequently injured. Id. at 439. The court held that although she had made the
sufficient minimal showing necessary to survive a summary judgment motion on her
sexual harassment claim, her allegations concerning her supervisor's conduct did not
rise to the level necessary to prove a retaliation claim. Id.
74. Id. at 439.
75. Little v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 330, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
The court found that the "prohibition against retaliation is intended to protect
employees who resist unlawful workplace discrimination. Sexual harassment by an
employer or supervisor is an unlawful practice, and an employee's refusal is a means
of opposing such unlawful conduct." Id.
76. See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 1995); Sumner v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1990).
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The Second Circuit held in Sumner v. United States Postal Service
that
In addition to protecting the filing of formal charges of [race]
discrimination, [the] opposition clause protects as well informal
protests [such as] making complaints to management, writing
critical letters to customers, protesting against discrimination by
industry or by society in general, and77expressing support of coworkers who have filed formal charges.
The Third Circuit adopted a more restrictive view of the opposition
clause in an age discrimination case decided five years after Sumner,
holding that although the plaintiff had voiced his opinion that he had
been unfairly treated in the workplace, he had not "explicitly or
implicitly allege[d]" the reason for the unfair treatment was due to his
age, and therefore had not adequately stated a claim for retaliation
under § 2000e-3. 8
Extrapolating and comparing the Second and Third Circuit's
rulings in their race and age discrimination cases to the present issue,
it is likely that these circuits may decide that rejection of an
employer's sexual advances is a protected activity in regard to a
retaliation claim, provided that the employee explicitly or implicitly
alleges that the adverse employment action is in response to the
rejection of the employer's sexual advances. Thus, although this view
would not be as expansive as the Eighth Circuit's holding that mere
rejection of an employer's sexual advances, without more, constitutes
a protected activity, it would allow an employee the opportunity to
bring a retaliation claim if he or she explicitly or implicitly
communicated a causal connection between the protected activity in
which he or she was engaged and a consequent adverse employment
action taken by the employer.
Like the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit
also has not decided the issue of whether rejection of an employer's
sexual advances constitutes a protected activity in regard to a
retaliation claim. However, the Fourth Circuit has indicated it will
adopt a broad interpretation of the term "protected activity,"
cautioning in Armstrong v. Index Journal that a protected activity is
77. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209.
78. Barber,68 F.3d at 701-02.
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not necessarily one that rises to the level of a formal complaint.7 9
Interpreting Armstrong, one district court within the Fourth Circuit
held that "voicing complaints to employers or using an employer's
grievance procedures" are only examples of what may constitute a
80
protected activity and not an exhaustive list of protected activities.
Accordingly, the district court in Fleming found that "an employer
cannot retaliate against an employee for engaging in protected
activity, which includes an employee's refusal of the sexual advances
of a supervisor or employer." 81 Moreover, responding to the idea
expressed in other district courts that every harassment claim would
automatically state a retaliation claim if rejection of a supervisor's
sexual advances constituted a protected activity, 82 the Fleming court
held:
[N]ot every sexual harassment claim would automatically state a
retaliation claim ....[T]he gravamen of a sexual harassment case
is sexual harassment, while the gravamen of a retaliation case is
retaliation. If the employer is motivated to take adverse
employment action because of retaliatory animus, it is properly
categorized as a retaliation claim. Even if permitting the refusal of a
supervisor's sexual advances did permit a plaintiff to bring a
retaliation claim and sexual harassment claim, there has been no
explanation as to the harm that such a result would have. The

79. Armstrong v. Index Journal, 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding
that although the opposition clause "was not intended to immunize insubordinate,
disruptive, or nonproductive behavior at work," it encompassed "informal protests"
such as complaints to one's employer).
80. Fleming v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 952 F. Supp. 283, 287 n.4 (D.S.C. 1996).
81. Id. at 288.
82. See Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 437, 438-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). The district court rejected an employee's claim of unlawful
retaliation, finding that her supervisor "did not mistreat, demote, fire, discipline, or
punish plaintiff in any way." Id. at 439. Rather, "[t]he sole act of 'retaliation' . . . is
that her . . . supervisor, after being rebuffed in his unwanted sexual advances,

'forced Plaintiff to move material which was beyond her physical capabilities ....'
Id. The court remarked that "even the broadest interpretation of a retaliation claim
cannot encompass instances where the alleged 'protected activity' consists simply of
declining a harasser's sexual advances..." Id. at 438-39.
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plaintiff would always be separately required to separately
prove
8
the elements necessary under both causes of actions. 3
However, like the Second Circuit, 84 the Fourth Circuit has not
reviewed this district court's ruling.
III. CONJECTURE AS TO How THE SUPREME COURT WOULD
RULE ON THIS ISSUE

Based on the fact that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have come to
differing conclusions as to whether an employee's rejection of a
supervisor's sexual advances is a protected activity, and also because
the other circuits have either not addressed or not squarely ruled on
the issue, the Supreme Court should resolve the controversy. Applying
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee to its
previous jurisprudence in this area,8 5 it seems likely the Supreme
Court would rule that rejecting a sexual advance is a protected
activity, despite the 86Court's more stringent rulings in regard to
discrimination claims.
A. The Crawford Spin
Supporting the proposition that the Court would find a protected
activity in these types of cases is the recent Supreme Court ruling in
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee. 87 In this case, employee Vicki Crawford
cooperated with an internal investigation of inappropriate sexual

83. Fleming, 952 F. Supp. at 295.
84. See Del Castillo, 941 F. Supp. at 438-39.
85. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67
(2006) (expanding the anti-retaliation provision beyond "workplace-related or
employment-related retaliatory acts and harms" rather than limiting the scope to
strictly "ultimate employment decisions"); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
346 (1997) (broadening the definition of "employee" within the context of § 2000e3 to include former employees as well as current employees).
86. See discussion supra Part II.A.
87. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S.
Ct. 846 (2009).
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conduct by employee Dr. Gene Hughes. 8 8 She neither initiated the
investigation nor filed a formal complaint. 89 Rather, Crawford merely
responded to questions her employer asked about Hughes, stating he
had sexually harassed her in the workplace. 90 After the investigation
concluded, Crawford and the other employees who had cooperated
with their employers were investigated on other grounds and
eventually terminated. 9 ' In her subsequent suit alleging unlawful
retaliation under § 2000e-3, Crawford asserted that during the initial
investigation when she came forward with the incidents of sexual
harassment, she believed she was exercising her right to oppose
92
unlawful behavior by participating in the investigation.
In granting a summary judgment motion made by Metropolitan,
the district court held that because Crawford had not initiated the
harassment complaint against Hughes, but rather had merely answered
questions asked of her pursuant to an internal company investigation,
she had not engaged in a protected activity for purposes of a
retaliation claim under § 2000e-3.9 3 On Crawford's appeal, the Sixth
Circuit agreed, likewise finding that Crawford's complaints of sexual
harassment during the company's internal investigation was not a
protected activity. 94 The court determined that an employee's
"opposition" must be active and consistent to qualify as a protected
activity under the opposition clause of § 2000e-3. 95

88. Id. at 849.
89. Id.
90. Id. Additionally, two other employees accused Hughes of sexually
harassing them. Id.
91. The employer accused Crawford of embezzlement and drug use, which
Crawford states was "ultimately found to be unfounded." Crawford v. Metro. Gov't
of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 F. App'x 373, 375 (6th Cir. 2006),
overruled by 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
92. Crawford, 211 F. App'x at 374-75. Specifically, Crawford stated in an
affidavit that she "opposed" Hughes's actions by participating in the investigation
against him. Brief for the Petitioner at 4 n.5, Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville
& Davidson County, Tenn., No. 06-1595 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2008) (quoting R. at 12).

She believed she was "exercising [her] rights under Federal law." Id.
93. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850 (2009).
94. Crawford, 211 F. App'x at 376.
95. Id.
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The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in the case, 96
and a unanimous Court ultimately rejected the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning, finding that an employee is protected under the opposition
clause if he or she chooses to participate in an internal investigation of
a supervisor's alleged discrimination. 97 In supporting its decision, the
Supreme Court stated the word "'oppose' goes beyond 'active,
consistent' behavior in ordinary discourse." 98 However, the Court also
noted that "oppose" could be used in a different, more passive context,
such as a person who opposed slavery before the Emancipation or
those who oppose capital punishment today. 99 Thus, the Court
reasoned a person can "oppose" conduct when responding to
questions asked by an employer, just as surely as a person can
"oppose" conduct when initiating the discussion, noting "nothing in
the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same
' 00
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question."'
B. Broadeningthe Crawford Reasoning to Cover an Employee's
Rejection of a Supervisor'sSexual Advances
By interpreting the scope of the opposition clause of § 2000e-3 so
broadly, the Supreme Court implies that it might construe an
employee's rejecting his or her supervisor's sexual advances as a
protected activity. 101 Indeed, in deciding that an employee is protected
under the opposition clause if he or she chooses merely to participate
in an internal investigation, the Court indicates that the breadth of
protected activities is much wider than most lower courts have
96.
97.
98.
99.

Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
Id. at 852-53.
Id. at 851.
Id. "Opposition" is defined as a "hostile or contrary action or condition."
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 816 (10th ed. 1993).
100. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851.
101. Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion with Justice Thomas joining.
Justice Alito stressed that he understood the Court's holding to only apply to
employees participating in internal investigations, extending no further because
opposition requires "active" and "purposive" conduct. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 854
(Alito, J., concurring). Although these two justices might disagree, it is likely the
majority will not apply the strict reasoning set forth in Justice Alito's concurring
opinion in future retaliation cases.
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previously thought, particularly since many lower courts have
interpreted the opposition clause as relating only to an "affirmative
complaint or report" of the alleged sexual misconduct in violation of
Title VII. 10 2 Crawford neither initiated the investigation nor filed a
103
formal complaint against Dr. Hughes.
Expanding upon the reasoning given in Crawford that active,
consistent activities "exemplify opposition" but "are not limits of
[opposition]," it is reasonable to assume the Court would find that the
opposition clause covers an employee's rejection of an employer's
sexual advances, particularly in light of the Court's acknowledgement
104
that the primary goal of § 2000e-3 is to keep employees from harm.
The Crawford decision suggests the Supreme Court understands the
workplace reality that employees fear retaliation if they decide to
speak out against discrimination,10 5 and thus the Court would continue
to expand upon the opposition clause in order to encourage employees
to come forward with claims. In response to the Crawford decision,
Professor Paul Secunda, an employment law scholar at Marquette
University Law School, stated "[t]his holding makes sense from what
the court wants employers to do-investigate and promptly correct
discrimination-and what it wants employees to do-speak up and
10 6
not worry about retaliation. It makes complete sense."

102. See, e.g., Coe v. N. Pipe Products, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1105 (N.D.
Iowa 2008). The court stated that "[i]t is not enough [for purposes of establishing a
retaliation claim] to show that the plaintiff simply deflected invitations or advances
that the recipient considered improper or offensive." Id.
103. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211
Fed. Appx. 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006), overruled by 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
104. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
105. Joanna L. Grossman & Deborah Brake, The Supreme Court Restores
Title VII's Protection Against Retaliation, but Employees Still Face Gaps in

Retaliation Law, Feb.
3,
2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/
20090203.html. An employee who fears retaliation "might be tempted to feign
ignorance, memory lapse, or worse, lie to protect an accused harasser." Id. Such a
response by the employee "would greatly undermine the statutory goal of voluntary
compliance, and would leave the complainant out in the cold, with the
discrimination unverified and unremedied." Id. Nothing in Title VII requires
employees to face such a predicament." Id.
106. Marcia Coyle, Lawyers Say Ruling Could Cause Increase in Retaliation
Claims, 239 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 20 (2009).
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IV. WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF A
"PROTECTED ACTIVITY" TO INCLUDE REJECTION OF A
SUPERVISOR'S SEXUAL ADVANCES

A. The Social Science Argument
Social science research indicates that legal protections against
retaliation are important measures in protecting an employee from
discrimination. In order for discrimination laws to remain an effective
control against sexual harassment in our society, it is of paramount
importance that employees do not feel that their supervisors will
retaliate against them for speaking out against perceived
discrimination in the workplace. 107
A person who is potentially subject to a lawsuit, regardless of the
substantive claim, is likely to feel frustrated, particularly due to threat
of injury or of defeat. 108 Thus, it is not surprising that those who have
been discriminated against in the workplace are reluctant to report it,
in large part because they are fearful of the litigation process. Further,
employees, particularly women and racial minorities, subjected to
discrimination do not want to perceive themselves as victims. 10 9 The
tendency is to look inward and blame themselves rather than to look to
an external factor such as discrimination. 110 Even for those who do
recognize employer behavior as discriminatory, many employees are
reluctant to publicly and actively confront the discriminatory
behavior."' This may be due in part to the fact that the employee is
aware that he or she may have to answer "intimidating questions" and
be exposed to "invasive inquiries" as a result of confronting the

107.

Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 20 (2005). Because

an employee's fears of retaliation may suppress his or her valid discrimination
claim, "the effectiveness and very legitimacy of discrimination law turns on people's
ability to raise concerns about discrimination without fear of retaliation." Id.
108.

Robert S. Redmount, Psychological Discontinuities in the Litigation

Process,4 DUKE L.J. 571, 572 (1959).
109. Brake, supra note 107, at 26. For example, "[p]ersons who acknowledge
that discrimination disadvantages their social group as a whole nonetheless tend to
see themselves as the lucky exceptions, even when confronted with reason to believe
that they themselves have experienced discrimination." Id.
110. Id. at 27.
111. Id.at3I.
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discriminatory behavior. 1 2 Additionally, those who choose to report
discrimination are often perceived as troublemakers. 1 3 Research
shows that a large number of individuals in the workplace dislike
women and minorities who allege discrimination in the workplace,
1 14
even if the allegations can be supported.'
Most importantly, the threat of retaliation silences many from
challenging workplace discrimination.1 1 5 Before speaking out against
discrimination, a person will typically conduct a cost-benefit analysis
to determine whether he or she should speak out against the
employer.11 6 If a person thinks, based on past observations, he or she
may be retaliated against by his or her employer, the person will not
be likely to come forward to expose the employer's unlawful
practices."' Further, since "[r]etaliation has heightened power to
silence discrimination claims within institutions that have a high
tolerance for discrimination and retaliation,"'1 8 an employee who sees
the employer retaliate against a colleague for confronting
discrimination in the workplace is less likely to report his or her
legitimate claims.
Ultimately, although "[j]udicial opinions on sexual harassment
portray reporting [by filing a formal complaint] as the only reasonable
course of action,"'1 19 many victims are reluctant to report the unlawful

112. Larry J. Cohen & Joyce H. Vesper, Forensic Stress Disorder,25 LAW &

PSYCHOL. REv. 1, 8 (2001). For example, the employee may be asked probing
questions which seem insulting since such questions may challenge his or her
honesty or integrity. Id. at 10. Further, the employee may not see the relationship
between the questions asked of him or her and the specific claim. Id.
113. See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 794
(2004), affid, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). The employee testified that her supervisor
informed her that a company official considered her a "troublemaker" after she filed
charges with the EEOC about specific acts of workplace sexual harassment. Id.
114. Brake, supra note 107, at 32.
115. Id. at25.
116. Id. at 37. An employee conducting such an analysis will likely find that
reporting discrimination in the workplace entails high costs, particularly a fear of
provoking retaliation. Id.
117. Id. at39.
118. Id.
119. Anne Lawton, Between Sylla and Charybdis: The Perils of Reporting
Sexual Harassment,9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 603, 604 (2007).
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behavior. 120 Thus, it is imperative that rejection of a supervisor's
sexual advances, which is the only course of action most employees
take in such a situation, 12 is protected from retaliation.
B. The Statistics Argument
Statistical data also shows the need for more expansive legal
protections to insulate employees from discrimination and subsequent
retaliation in the workplace. Estimates suggest that between 40% and
60% of working women have been sexually harassed in the
workplace. In male-dominated workplaces, even conservative
estimates suggest that as many as 75% of women have been
22

harassed. 1

The largest and most well-known survey of sexual harassment,
commissioned by Congress in 1995, found that most federal
employees, who made up an alarming 44% of employees who were
victims of workplace discrimination, reacted to sexual harassment by
doing nothing. 123 Of those who took action, most responded by simply
asking the harasser to stop and rejecting the advances.' 24 This
comprised 35% of the actions taken by remaining victims, and only
12% reported the matter to a supervisor or other official. 125 Of those
who chose not to file formal complaints against their employer,
several indicated fears of retaliation in the workplace: 29% feared the

120. See, e.g., id. at 608. Professor Anne Lawson rejected sexual advances
from a tenured professor. Id. She admits she was reluctant to report the sexual
harassment out of fear that he would retaliate by voting against her during school
deliberations to assess her future tenure and promotion possibilities. Id.
121. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
122. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure of Reason in the
Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1399, 1400-01 (1992).
123. BEN L. ERDREICH, BETH S. SLAVET, & ANTONIO C. AMADOR, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING
CHALLENGES ix (1995). One famous example of an employee who initially did not

confront sexual harassment in the workplace is Professor Anita Hill, who once
worked for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. Fitzgerald, supra note 122, at
1402. Several senators who asserted the falsity of her later accusations against
Justice Thomas referenced her initial inaction as support for their position. Id.
124. ERDREICH, SLAVET, & AMADOR, supra note 123, at 30.
125. Id.
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work situation would become unpleasant, and 17% thought it would
126
adversely affect their careers.
Similarly, after the media reported that large numbers of
employees at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) had filed
complaints of sexual harassment in recent years, NIH requested the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a survey of its
27
workplace to determine the prevalence and severity of the problem.'
GAO surveyed 4,110 NIH employees, of which 32% responded by
alleging sexual harassment in the workplace the previous year. 128 An
astonishing 96% of those who stated they had been harassed chose not
to report the unlawful behavior. 129 The employees cited varying
reasons for not reporting the harassment, the most common of which
were: 1) they did not believe the conduct was serious enough to
report; 2) the employees chose to deal with it themselves; and 3) they
0
chose to ignore the harassment.13
Although these statistics represent sexual harassment in the
federal workplace, the survey determined that findings in the nonfederal workplace were similar.' 3 ' For example, the American Bar
Association Commission on Women in the Profession reported that
fewer than 10% of women lawyers who were victims of sexual assault
132
filed a formal complaint due to fear of retaliation in the workplace.
As the Seventh Circuit has opined, "[p]assive resistance is a time
' 33
honored form of opposition."'

126. Id.

127. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY:
NIH's HANDLING OF ALLEGED SExuAL HARASSMENT AND SEX DISCRIMINATION

MATTERS 1, 1 (1995), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg95192.pdf.

128. Id. Appendix III of the report describes in detail the methodology of data
collection.
129. Id.
130. Id. The employees stated additional reasons, though not as common, for
not reporting the harassment, such as a belief the harasser would not be punished,
thoughts that the incident would not be kept confidential, and a fear of retaliation.
Id.
131. ERDREICH, SLAVET, & AMADOR, supra note 123, at 19.
132. Deborah L. Rhode, The Unfinished Agenda: Women and the Legal
Profession, 2001 A.B.A. COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION 20, available at

http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/women/unfinishedagenda.pdf.
133. McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Because it is not only prevalent, but also frighteningly customary,
that employees in the workplace do not report discriminatory
employer practices due to fears of retaliation, it is crucial that the
Supreme Court broadens the scope of what constitutes a protected
activity for purposes of a retaliation claim. Doing so will afford the
necessary legal protections under the anti-retaliation provision of §
2000e-3 to those employees who merely reject sexual advances from
their supervisors.
C. Deference to the EEOC
If the Supreme Court decides to take the Eighth Circuit's
approach in dealing with the issue of whether an employee who
rejects his or her supervisor's sexual advances is protected under the
opposition clause by finding that an employee has engaged in a
protected activity, 134 it would give appropriate deference to the
EEOC's determinations in this area. 135 The Supreme Court has stated
"the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation." Instead, the court must decide "whether the agency's
answer [to a specific issue] is based on a permissible construction of
' 13 6

the statute."
Just as the Supreme Court looks to EEOC findings for guidance in
defining sexual harassment,' 37 it should give appropriate deference to
the EEOC in shaping the boundaries of the opposition clause of §
2000e-3. 13 8 The EEOC has described an action or statement as
134. See discussion supra Part II.D.l.b.
135. The EEOC is the federal agency entrusted with the enforcement of the
federal laws prohibiting job discrimination and retaliation, including Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Federal
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Laws,
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeo/
overviewlaws.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
136. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
137. See supra note 21.
138. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that, in some circumstances,
"Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it
addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law" and thus the
reviewing court should not reject the agency's contentions simply because the court
disagrees with the agency's findings. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
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oppositional if it "would reasonably [be] interpreted as opposition
[against the unlawful employment practice]., 139 Additionally, the
EEOC has indicated that protection under the opposition clause
applies if the employee has "explicitly or implicitly [communicated] a
belief that [the employer's] activity constitutes a form of employment
discrimination." 140
As a district court in the Second Circuit has reasoned, "[t]he
prohibition against retaliation is intended to protect employees who
resist unlawful workplace discrimination. Sexual harassment by an
employer or supervisor is an unlawful practice, and an employee's
refusal is a means of opposing such unlawful conduct."' 14 'The EEOC
and other supporters of a broad encompassment of the opposition
clause see Title VII as "undoubtedly written against the common
sense understanding that no reasonable employee welcomes
discrimination in the workplace, especially when it is directed at the
employee herself, and that declarations that a supervisor engaged in,
for example, sexual harassment, constitutes opposition to that
42
activity."
D. Conclusion
The body of law that defines the scope of a retaliation claim is
largely judge-made, meaning that the scope varies immensely from
circuit to circuit.1 43 Based on the radically different and contradictory
interpretations of what actions constitute a protected activity at the
district and circuit court levels, the Supreme Court should issue a
decision to clear up confusion. "[A] uniform interpretation of the anti-

229 (2001).
139. 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, p. 8-5 (1998).
140. Id. § 8-4.
141. Little v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 210 F. Supp. 2d 330, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citation omitted).
142. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Employment Lawyers Ass'n in support
of Petitioner, Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn.,
2007 WL 2049297 (No. 06-1595).
143. Michael Newman & Faith Isenhath, Fidelity and Retaliation,56 FEDERAL

LAWYER 18, 32 (Jan. 2009).
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economy and ensure
retaliation provision would increase judicial 144
consistency in both the state and federal levels."

A scholar at Florida A&M College of Law observed in the
aftermath of the Supreme Court's ruling in Burlington Northern and
Santa Fe Railway Company v. White, 145 which resolved the circuit
splits concerning what employer actions constitute an "adverse
employment action" for purposes of a retaliation claim, that
"retaliatory harassment presents a substantial barrier to achieving Title
VII's goal of equality."1 46 The Court's decision, which added clarity
to the second element necessary to prove a retaliation claim, gave
"much-needed guidance to the courts."

14 7

Likewise, a Supreme Court

decision resolving the circuit splits of what constitutes a "protected
activity," the first element of a retaliation claim, will further the goals
of Title VII and offer "much-needed guidance" to the lower courts.
Based on the social science and statistics arguments, as well as the
"considerable weight [that] should be accorded to [the EEOC's]
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer," 148 the
Supreme Court should affirm the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Ogden
v. Wax Works, Inc. 149 and expand upon its holding in Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,
Tennessee, 150 ruling that merely resisting an employer's sexual
advances, without more, constitutes a "protected activity," thus
satisfying the opposition clause of § 2000e-3(a).
Further, in addition to the assertion that a "uniform interpretation"
of the opposition clause would aid the circuits in applying the law
consistently, direction from the Supreme Court would offer guidance
to employers who wish to act in compliance with the law and to
employees who are unsure as to whether they have a valid retaliation
144. Karl Jahnke, Retaliatory Harassment Against Employees by Employees:
Should the Employer Be Liable?, 16 LAB. LAW 465, 498-99 (2001).

145. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
146. Rhonda Reaves, Retaliatory Harassment: Sex and the Hostile Coworker
as the Enforcer of Workplace Norms, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 403, 418 (2007).

147. Id. at 421.
148. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
149. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000).
150. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129
S. Ct. 846 (2009).
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claim. Such a uniform interpretation would hopefully lead to a
decrease in litigation and more predictable results in the federal court
system as both employers and employees would be aware of the
retaliatory behaviors which are forbidden by § 2000e-3(a), thereby
furthering the purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the balance of rights between employer and employee.
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